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China’s healthcare system is experiencing significant growth from expanded government-backed insurance, greater
public-sector spending on hospitals, and the introduction of private insurance and for-profit clinics. An incremental
reform process has sought to develop market incentives for medical innovation and liberalize physician
compensation and hospital finance while continuing to keep basic care affordable to a large population that pays
for many components of care out-of-pocket. Additional changes presently under consideration by policymakers are
likely to further restructure insurance and the delivery of care and will alter competitive dynamics in major
healthcare industries, notably pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and diagnostic testing. This article describes the
institutional history of China’s healthcare system and identifies dilemmas emerging as the country negotiates
divisions between public and private in healthcare. Building on this analysis, the article considers opportunities for
public-private partnerships and greater systems integration to reconcile otherwise incommensurable approaches to
rewarding innovation and improving access. The article concludes with observations on the public function of
health insurance and its significance to further development of China’s healthcare system.
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Healthcare is arguably the most complex of the institu-
tional systems with which people interact on a regular
basis. In every country, healthcare systems combine to
differing degrees public state administration and private
market economies for insurance and the provision of
care. Debates about the superiority of predominantly
public or private systems have a strong ideological com-
ponent, and international comparisons are made difficult
by the reality of subtly different mixes of public and
private in each country and the shifts induced over time
by frequent reforms (Saltman 2003; Weintraub 1997).
Health systems nonetheless exhibit core identities based
on the division of power between public and private that
are open to negotiation at certain historical moments
but otherwise closed off to significant reform possibil-
ities (Rosenberg 2007). This article finds that that the
underlying identity and institutional design of China’s
health system is presently in flux. As policymakersCorrespondence: adaemmrich@kumc.edu
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in any medium, provided the original work is pnegotiate what counts as “public” and the role of “private”
in health insurance and the delivery of care, they also
are encountering a dilemma between supporting profit-
seeking industries that offer the potential for new medical
products and services but want free-market pricing, and
public access to low-cost care that requires redistributive
policies and price controls to function efficiently.
A decade of reforms to China’s healthcare system has
significantly broadened government-backed insurance
coverage and the availability of basic care. Industry ana-
lysts predict healthcare spending in China to grow further
to $1 trillion by 2020, which would triple 2010 levels and
then comprise an estimated 7 percent of GDP (Le Deu
et al. 2012). Policy discussions concerning where to direct
additional public spending and the degree of private enter-
prise that is desirable in China’s future healthcare system
are underway following a merger in early 2013 of the
Ministry of Health and the National Population and
Family Planning Commission to create the National
Health and Family Planning Commission (H&FPC).
While many analysts expect further liberalization of
insurance and hospitals, greater government spending
on health also will bring increased regulatory oversightn Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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tion of public interests.
Reflecting on these issues, the deputy director of the
powerful National Development and Reform Commission
emphasized “three basics as a guiding ideology” at a press
conference during the 12th National People’s Congress in
March, 2013. The “basics” include universal basic health
services, a basic principle of grass-roots orientation to
care, and a basic path to further reform through evolu-
tionary developments.a Other ministers speaking about
the healthcare system discussed significant additional
spending on insurance and care in order to reduce hos-
pital reliance on drug sales, raise physician salaries, and
shorten waiting times for patients.
Reforms under discussion may allow greater sale of
private insurance, privatize additional public hospitals,
and license new for-profit clinics. However, pressures
also will increase for the government to instead develop
a single-payer national insurance scheme and mandate
the use of inexpensive generics to bring down prescrip-
tion drug spending. China’s public has benefitted from a
significant increase in lifespan and an 11.5 percent de-
crease in infant mortality between 2000 and 2010 (OECD
2013). Tensions nevertheless are apparent concerning ac-
cess to care as hospitals build exclusive care suites, doc-
tors have incentives to prescribe imported brand-name
drugs while minimizing time spent with patients, and
people crowd into top-ranked urban hospitals. As a result,
reform to China’s healthcare system is an exercise in dra-
wing boundaries between public and private.
This article analyzes the historical and institutional
trajectory of the Chinese healthcare system, identifies di-
lemmas confronting healthcare reforms, and considers
initiatives underway in pharmaceutical research and the
development of electronic medical record systems. Par-
ticular focus is put on shifts between public and private
provision of insurance and medical care. I argue that the
Chinese healthcare system is at an inflection point be-
tween greater centralization and liberalization. Decisions
taken by policymakers over the next several years will
determine the future of private insurance, the viability
of new business models for private hospitals, and the
competitive dynamics for domestic and multinational
pharmaceutical, device, and diagnostics firms.
The analysis developed here is based on diverse quan-
titative and qualitative sources. The author conducted
observations at four hospitals and specialty clinics in
Shanghai and Xi’an, and carried out interviews with ex-
perts at insurance, pharmaceutical, medical device, diag-
nostics, and information technology (IT) companies.
The article also draws upon published data and official
reports from the former Ministry of Health and other go-
vernment ministries, interviews and speeches by govern-
ment officials, commercial databases accessed throughuniversity subscription, and existing scholarship in health
economics and policy.
This article adopts a historical perspective on institu-
tional change while also drawing on concepts from
health economics and political science concerning pub-
lic, private, and hybrid institutions. A longstanding body
of research has examined markets as optimal for the
production and exchange of private goods, while govern-
ment is needed to generate public goods and regulate
areas subject to market failure (Samuelson 1954; Breyer
1982). But as the economist Kenneth Arrow (1963) sug-
gested, the provision of medical care is complicated since
it exhibits dimensions of public goods (e.g., preventing
disease contagion or keeping people productive) and pri-
vate goods (e.g., seeing a physician or purchasing prescrip-
tion drugs). As a consequence, nearly every country’s
healthcare system has a mix of public and private insur-
ance, public and private delivery of care, and public and
private support for the development of new medicines
and treatments (Johnson and Stoskopf 2010).
Divisions of authority, responsibility, and allowance of
profit seeking that develop over time are revealing of the
underlying identity of a healthcare system. China offers a
rare example of a country that oscillated over a short
period of time between a public-private mix in the pre-
WWII period, to fully socialized healthcare from 1949
through the late 1970s, to a mixed system at present
(Barber and Yao 2011). This history makes China an
especially interesting country in which to examine shifts
between public and private in healthcare and the tradeoffs
that arise even during an expansionary reform process.
The article proceeds in three major sections. The first
develops an institutional history of healthcare in China
across traditional Chinese medicine, public health under
Mao Zedong, and health policy during the most recent
three decades of market-oriented reforms. The second
section identifies challenges for the current system based
on China’s three basic public insurance schemes, com-
peting forces affecting hospitals, tensions in the medical
profession, incentives for over-use of profit-generating
care, and changing demographics and disease dynamics.
Third, the article considers China’s potential to take a glo-
bal lead for clinical trials of new medicines and the deve-
lopment of electronic medical records through greater
public-private partnerships. Throughout, I emphasize con-
tinuities in healthcare institutions as well as areas where
policymakers are breaking with the past by facilitating an
increased role for the private sector.
Institutional history of healthcare in China
Policymakers in China presently face a daunting set of
challenges in the reform and expansion of the health
system. Large urban hospitals (tier-II and tier-III hospi-
tals in China’s domestic ranking system, under which
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diagnostics and drug sales, leading direct financial incen-
tives for doctors to over-prescribe brand-name drugs
and diagnostic tests (Ramesh et al. 2013). Medical infra-
structure varies tremendously among regions and capital
spending lags other sectors. The insurance system is
underdeveloped and consumer information necessary
for effective risk management and risk pricing is lacking.
The quality of medicines varies widely and counterfeits
of prescription drugs and traditional Chinese medicines
are widespread. Thanks to the interconnected nature of
the healthcare system, any regulatory changes will have
repercussions on incentives for physicians, hospitals, in-
surers, and pharmaceutical and medical device firms.
Understanding the historical development of China’s
healthcare institutions is a first step to analyzing con-
temporary negotiations on the balance between public
and private.
Traditional Chinese medicine
With a recorded history dating over 3,000 years, trad-
itional Chinese medicine (TCM) encompasses a range of
practices including herbal medicine, acupuncture, thera-
peutic massage, movement and exercise, and dietary
therapy (Sivin 1987; Liao 2011). TCM has sustained a
strong institutional basis in contemporary China, with
large medical universities, specialized hospitals, purpose-
built divisions within general hospitals, and private
clinics around the country. Approximately 2,000 TCM
companies produce plant-based and synthetic thera-
peutics in forms ranging from teas to pills. Systematic
research efforts are underway to characterize TCM
therapies using modern analytical chemistry instru-
mentation and to run formal clinical trials of TCM
drugs (Li et al. 2008).
Historically, TCM practitioners were paid at the point
of care, although some wealthier Chinese paid a retainer
to their doctor to keep them healthy. If they became ill,
the doctor returned part of the fee. In contemporary hos-
pitals and TCM clinics, patients pay on a fee-for-service
basis. Thanks to a concerted government effort to sustain
TCM alongside Western medicine, some physicians em-
ploy both therapeutic approaches. In most hospitals,
however, patients choose whether to be seen by a practi-
tioner of TCM or of Western medicine. Physicians of
either therapeutic direction routinely prescribe a com-
bination of drugs as in the West and herbals or teas
from the TCM materia medica. Hospital pharmacies
stock TCM treatments alongside small molecule drugs.
In addition, specialized TCM clinics can be found
across the country at which people can build long-term
relationships with their doctor, in contrast to crowded
hospitals where patients typically must see the next avai-
lable physician (Xu and Yang 2009).“Barefoot Doctors” and public health
At the inauguration of the People’s Republic of China
in 1949, the country had only 40,000 doctors to care
for a population of nearly 540 million. Despite a low
urbanization rate, most physicians were concentrated
in cities. Infectious and parasitic diseases were en-
demic and epidemics broke out with frequency in the
countryside. Mao considered the communist move-
ment to have originated in the peasant class and the
party consequently made rural healthcare one of its
top priorities.
New care providers were trained in three- to six-
month crash courses starting in the early 1950s and sent
to open rural clinics. Most also were expected to work
in the fields and received additional medical training
during winter months. By 1957, over 200,000 army vet-
eran doctors and nurses, quickly-trained physicians, and
TCM doctors were providing frontline care across
China, notably by treating wounds, providing antibiotics,
assisting in childbirth, vaccinating children, and advising
on basic hygiene (Zhang and Unschuld 2008). The mix
of care providers gained significant institutional support
after a 1965 speech in which Mao stated, “In medical
and health work, put the stress on the rural areas” (Wen
1974). Now named “barefoot doctors,” the frontline
practitioners also gained international recognition. Pub-
lic health measures such as building public latrines and
draining swamps sharply reduced infectious disease. One
widely acclaimed success was the near elimination of the
parasitic disease schistosomiasis.
Between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s, healthcare in
China was structured into a three-tiered system termed
the Cooperative Medical Scheme. The first tier consisted
of over one million barefoot doctors by the mid-1970s.
More complex or emergency cases were directed to the
second tier of commune-based health clinics funded by
local residents. A commune health clinic typically had
10 to 30 beds and one or two trained junior doctors.
When more serious care was needed, patients were
transferred to larger county or city hospitals; by the
mid-1970s, each county in China operated a general
hospital (Wen 1974). Communes paid fees for care out
of pooled funds.
Urban residents received care directly at hospitals, typ-
ically seeing the first available physician after registering.
The Cultural Revolution undermined medical services in
the cities, especially when some senior physicians were
branded as bourgeois counter-revolutionaries and many
younger doctors were sent to rural areas. Medical educa-
tion experienced significant setbacks when universities
were closed for long periods. Broadly, health policy from
the 1950s through the 1980s was characterized by a
focus on meeting the basic health needs of peasants, sol-
diers, and workers. Healthcare was seen as an integral
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the development of a collective Maoist Chinese identity.
Private firms and market incentives were eliminated
throughout the system, from hospitals to drug manufac-
turing (Yang 2010).
Market reforms and healthcare policy
Beginning in 1978, a gradual and sequential set of re-
forms encouraged the formation of township and village
enterprises, created special economic zones for export-
oriented businesses, and partially liberalized the financial
sector. Subsequent economic reforms in the 1980s
ended the commune system and reduced foreign inves-
tment and trade restrictions (Meessen and Bloom 2007).
In 1985, the ministry of health phased out support for
barefoot doctors (Zhang and Unschuld 2008). Those
able to pass qualifying examinations were now termed
“rural doctors”, while others were re-categorized as
health workers or medical aides. Rural Chinese began to
pay for care out of pocket, as was already common in
cities. With policymakers focused on economic develop-
ment and managing the introduction of market capital-
ism, healthcare was largely ignored and the Cooperative
Medical Scheme collapsed (Zhang 1999; Liu et al. 2006).
Between 1980 and 2000, out-of-pocket spending by indi-
viduals thus increased from 21 percent to 60 percent of
all health expenditures (see Table 1). The government’s
share, by contrast, shrank from over 36 percent to 14
percent (Ministry of Health 2012a). Nevertheless, hospi-
tals remained dominated by state ownership and govern-
ment control. Few private clinics were opened.
At the same time, rapid economic growth in the coastal
areas and migration to urban centers meant that China
shifted from 19 percent of the population living in cities in
1980 to over 50 percent by 2011 (Meng 2010; China Daily
2012). Physicians and trained medical personnel likewise
moved to cities; in the space of fifteen years, township
health centers across China lost nearly all of their qualifiedTable 1 Healthcare expenditures and sources of












1980 3.15 36.2 42.6 21.2
1985 3.09 38.6 33.0 28.5
1990 4.00 25.1 39.2 35.7
1995 3.54 18.0 35.6 46.4
2000 4.62 15.5 25.6 59.0
2005 4.68 17.9 29.9 52.2
2010 5.01 28.6 35.9 35.5
aPercentage of total healthcare spending.
Source: P.R. China. 2012. Health Statistical Digest. Beijing: P.R. China.doctors (Gong and Wilkes 1997). As the economy grew at
double-digit rates, a middle class emerged. However, few
employers provided health insurance and only expatriates
had access to private insurance. Even in cities, health in-
surance became rare, with a decline in the number of
people covered during the 1990s that eventually bottomed
out at 40 percent (Liu et al. 2000).
Thus in the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese principally
self-insured. When ill, they drew upon savings, family
funds, and friends and co-workers to pay medical ex-
penses. As a result, the Ministry of Health in 2000
warned that nearly one-quarter of new cases of poverty
could be attributed to medical expenses (Meng and Hu
2000). A follow-up study by health economists found a
44 percent increase in the number of rural households
living in poverty as a result of out-of-pocket medical
spending (Liu et al. 2003). According to a national sur-
vey conducted in 2003, nearly 50 percent of Chinese
reporting an illness did not seek outpatient care and 30
percent of those advised by a physician to be hospital-
ized did not do so; in both cases, the majority cited fi-
nancial concerns as the primary reason (Yip and Mahal
2008).
System integration also declined significantly, and pa-
tients fell into gaps between different components of the
health system. For basic care, people had to wait in long
queues at hospitals, with no possibility for scheduled ap-
pointments and little privacy during a brief physician
consultation. Since patients did not have a regular pri-
mary care physician or clinic, they had to maintain and
carry with them personal medical records. A lack of co-
ordination among health facilities also contributed to a
rise of communicable diseases in China in the 1990s and
early 2000s (Liu 2004; Tang and Squire 2005).
Healthcare in this period was seen as a consumption
activity rather than a fundamental right of the people or
a responsibility of the state as part of its goals for eco-
nomic growth. Conceptually, health shifted from a pub-
lic good to the private responsibility of each individual.
Institutionally, most healthcare services remained public,
with government-set prices for doctor visits, surgery,
and other care. But the provision of medicines, diagnos-
tic tests, surgical implants, and specialized care shifted
to a free-market model.
Dilemmas for contemporary health system reform
Insurance
Starting in the mid-2000s, the Chinese government
began to increase spending on healthcare, mostly to ex-
pand insurance coverage but also for biomedical infra-
structure of hospitals and research facilities (Barber and
Yao 2011). A series of pilot projects begun in 300 rural
counties in 2003 subsequently evolved into the New
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) on the national
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NCMS offers very basic subsidized insurance to house-
holds. At its origin, a typical insured member paid an an-
nual contribution of 10 RMB ($1.60)b, with additional
contributions by the central and local governments of 20
RMB each; premiums and coverage subsequently rose,
though only modestly. Administration of NCMS and
coverage decisions are the responsibility of local govern-
ments, who manage budgets by setting reimbursement
limits. At present, coverage is limited to inpatient care and
annual ceilings per patient are used to control expendi-
tures. In 2012, the government set a common formula for
coverage limits of eight times average annual farm income,
but not less than 60,000 RMB ($9,600). NCMS operates
on a local basis, and deductibles and copayments typically
increase for treatment away from home (Brown and
Theoharides 2009).
Although NCMS is voluntary, it was designed from
the start with sufficient scale to allow for risk pooling.
The central government encouraged provinces to ac-
tively build membership through a baseline requirement
of 80 percent participation for receipt of subsidies (You
and Kobayashi 2009). While payment models such as
capitation were used on an experimental basis in the
early 2000s, fee-for-service emerged as the dominant ap-
proach by the end of the decade. Studies of NCMS have
found that the utilization of services rose, but its im-
plementation also increased out-of-pocket spending
since insurance did not cover chronic disease care or most
branded prescription drugs (Yip and Hsiao 2009; Wagstaff
et al. 2007).
For working urban residents, health insurance has
been available since 1998 through the Urban Employee
Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) program, which
covers employees in private and state-owned enterprises,
government, social organizations, and non-profits. Em-
ployees of state-owned enterprises and their dependents
were previously covered under a government employee
insurance scheme. In 2007, the government ran pilot
programs in 79 cities to test coverage of non-working
urban residents, including family members of people
covered by UEBMI. This new Urban Residents Basic
Medical Insurance (URBMI) was expanded nationally
the following year (Liu and Zhao 2012). Some 420 mil-
lion non-salaried elderly, unemployed, and children in
cities now obtain inexpensive coverage through URMBI.
Premiums range across the country, but are low by
international standards. Government subsidies in 2011
were 200 RMB per person ($32).
Similar to the rural program, URBMI operates at the
city level following broad central government guidelines
and participation is voluntary. As with NCMS, utilization
rates and out-of-pocket spending increased following
implementation of the urban insurance schemes, sincemany prescription drugs were not covered and URMBI
pays for only 45 percent of inpatient medical costs (Lin
et al. 2000).
As part of a package of fiscal stimulus measures in
2009, the government announced 850 billion RMB
($136 billion) in new health sector spending, spread
among the urban and rural insurance schemes (National
Development and Reform Commission 2009). For NCMS,
premium subsidies were raised to 120 RMB ($19.20).
Urban insurance programs also benefitted, as UEBMI was
extended to over 180 million enrollees, and URBMI be-
came comprehensive in reach. Annual ceilings were raised
to six times the local average wage for UEBMI and six
times the local per capita disposable income for URBMI.
Although direct spending on rural and urban insurance
was the most visible component of the 2009 program,
plans also were announced for new hospital construction,
renovations to existing facilities, and policy changes to
create an essential drug list and initiate public hospital fi-
nance reform.
When announcing the 2009 healthcare package, the
Central Committee and State Council took note of mount-
ing tensions:
Health care undertakings are developing unevenly
between urban and rural areas and among different
regions; resource allocation is unreasonable; the work
of public health as well as rural and community
health care is comparatively weak; the medical
insurance system is incomplete; pharmaceutical
production and circulation is not well regulated;
the hospital managerial system and operational
mechanism are imperfect; government investment
in health is insufficient; medical costs are soaring
individual burden is too heavy, and therefore,
the people’s reaction is very strong (National
Development and Reform Commission 2009).
Government spending and incentives for participation
nonetheless expanded basic coverage from an estimated
low point of 40 percent of urban residents and only 4
percent of rural dwellers in the late 1990s to 95 percent
overall by 2012 (Meng and Tang 2010; People’s Republic
of China 2012a). Patients across the country now can
see a physician at little or no direct cost, either at an
urban public hospital or at a rural clinic. But diagnostic
tests and treatments ranging from prescription drugs to
surgery still require advance out-of-pocket payments,
and only a small subset of the population is covered by
employer-sponsored or other supplemental insurance.
Seeking to build on its success at expanding basic
coverage, in 2012 the Ministry of Health announced a
special fund for 125 billion RMB ($20 billion) in new
healthcare spending alongside a proposal to expand
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nationwide by 2020. Specifics remain to be developed,
but the government has proposed covering treatment
costs above an upper limit of 50,000 RMB ($8,000), ei-
ther completely or on a sliding scale. However, as the
H&FPC plans additional reforms, institutionalized be-
haviors among the key players in the healthcare system
are challenging the balance it seeks to strike between
public and private in insurance and the delivery of care.
Hospitals
With few exceptions, hospitals in China are built,
owned, and operated by public authorities. They receive
national and provincial or city government funding
based on metrics such as the number of beds filled on a
monthly or annual basis and staff size relative to the
number of patients treated and discharged. At the same
time, the government limits hospital revenue through
the “Yellow Book”, a price list for thousands of medical
procedures and services, many set at or even below their
direct cost (Liu and Mills 2005). With a 15 percent
markup permitted on prescription drugs and diagnostic
testing, hospitals earn up to 50 percent of their revenue
and in many cases 90 percent of profits from just these
two areas.
Hospitals serve multiple functions in China’s healthcare
system in the absence of private practices or specialty
clinics. They have strong incentivizes to maximize the
number of patients seen by doctors, make heavy use of
diagnostic and scanning equipment, and push branded
prescription drugs. Since patients typically fill prescrip-
tions on-site (80 percent of retail pharmaceutical sales
take place in hospital pharmacies), hospitals capture the
difference between wholesale and retail prices. Further-
more, studies of health spending in China suggest that
hospitals regularly receive kickbacks from drug companies
and medical suppliers (Yip et al. 2010). As a consequence,
75 percent of patients suffering from common colds and
79 percent of all hospitalized patients are prescribed anti-
biotics, well over double the global average (Yip and Hsiao
2008). A similar pattern has been identified for hormones
(notably corticosteroids) and injected and infused antibi-
otics, which are prescribed at rates triple those of other
middle-income countries (Li et al. 2012; Reynolds and
McKee 2011).
Critics within China lament the high-speed, high-
throughput approach to patient care common across the
country. At the same time, hospitals achieve remarkably
fast service at low cost. Despite only 1.5 practicing phy-
sicians per 1,000 population (contrasted with 2.4 per 1,000
in the United States and 3.5 per 1,000 in Germany)
China’s hospitals handled 2.3 billion outpatient visits and
108 million inpatients in 2011 (People’s Republic of China
2012a). Still, hospitals are criticized for profiteering fromexcess care for those able to pay, while ignoring or under-
treating poorer patients. Government leaders including
former Health Minister Zhu Chen have commented
openly on the need to improve hospital efficiency and deal
with public concerns regarding “poor access and high
fees” (Fei 2012). Hospitals nevertheless are public in own-
ership and financing, even as a small number of specialty
clinics and VIP treatment centers with a maximum of 50
beds have been licensed in wealthier cities.
One model for private clinics involves their construc-
tion adjacent or in close proximity to existing top-tier
urban hospitals. Clinics such as those operated by
Parkway Health, a Singaporean company, offer better
facilities and advance scheduling of doctor visits and
surgical procedures. Private clinics employ the same
physicians that work in public hospitals, but with sig-
nificantly better compensation. Wealthier patients enjoy a
better experience of high quality facilities and minimal
wait times even as some of the population pressure on the
public system is reduced. However, this initially modest
degree of privatization could evolve to better care for the
wealthy and greater social fragmentation. Supporters of
private care delivery argue that physicians will continue to
work in public hospitals for career advancement and pres-
tige even as they offset poor compensation from public
hospitals.
Medical profession
Employed principally by hospitals, physicians in China
are in the process of building professional associations
and establishing a corpus of medical ethics and codes of
practice beyond the communist party mandate to “serve
the people wholeheartedly” (Yang 2010). Base salaries
are notoriously low, with a national average of only
4,200 RMB monthly ($672) (Chinese Medical Doctor
Association 2011). Even in top-tier cities, such as Shanghai,
monthly pay starts at 5,000 RMB ($800) for young doctors
and rises to just 10,000 RMB ($1,600) for experienced
physicians. But doctors typically also receive a significant
yearly bonus that adds 40 percent or more to their sa-
laries. Bonuses are based on the hospital’s overall re-
venue or the quantity of services a physician provides,
including admissions, medical procedures, tests, and pre-
scriptions (Yip et al. 2010). In a study critical of the
practice, public health scholars noted that admissions
had doubled and the frequency of operations tripled at
hospitals that implemented revenue-related bonus sys-
tems (Liu and Mills 2005). Overall, concerns have been
raised that Chinese doctors are implicated in a system
with financial incentives to provide unnecessary care.
Physicians and ethicists warn that medical judgment is
being distorted (Chen 2007).
Beyond salaries and bonuses, physicians earn significant
additional compensation from informal payments by
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containing cash. A regulation proposed by the Ministry
of Health in August 2012 would require doctors and pa-
tients to sign an agreement in which the doctor vows
not to ask for money and the patient vows not to try to
hand over an envelope (Qingyun 2012). Since hóng bāo
is transferred in private and the practice is deeply en-
grained in a Chinese gift culture that fosters relational
ties, it is unlikely that the rule by itself will change the
practice.
Medical education also is a topic of reform discus-
sions. Students of clinical medicine enroll directly from
secondary school for medical degrees that require three
(diploma), five (bachelors), six (bachelors), seven (mas-
ters), or eight (full M.D.) years of education. Specialists
have another two years of training (Xu et al. 2010). As
part of the 2009 reforms, the government reversed previ-
ous plans to phase out 3-year programs and instead re-
focused them on training for rural primary care. Even as
the country struggles with a shortage of primary care
physicians, concerns have been raised that medical
schools admit too many students, weakening the quality
of education and generating a shortage of clinical intern-
ship positions (Ba 2007). The combination of openings
for students but low compensation for physicians has
produced a peculiar employment dynamic in China.
Until the late 1990s, nearly every new doctor went to work
as practicing physicians. But in the decade between 2000
and 2010, the majority of medical graduates found em-
ployment outside of general medicine, often for pharma-
ceutical or medical device firms (People’s Republic of
China 2012b).
Strained doctor-patient relationships
As a result of the incentive for hospitals to speed pa-
tients through consultations and sell them medicines,
doctor-patient relations are severely strained. Patients
resent a lack of privacy in hospitals, complain on the
Internet about better care for well-connected people, and
perceive doctors as arrogant and uncaring. Tensions have
mounted with a spate of attacks on medical personnel by
patients and their families, averaging one per month in
2010 and 2011 (Jiang 2011; Yingqi 2011).c
For their part, physicians express severe stress concerning
workload and poor pay. Doctors commonly see twenty or
more patients per hour and in some clinics, patients pile
into doctors’ offices while jostling for a position. Noting the
challenges for physicians, the vice minister of health, Huang
Jiefu, stated, “How could a doctor maintain a good attitude
for all day long, with no time to take a rest, to drink, and
to go to the toilet?” (Fei 2012). According to a poll
conducted by the Chinese Medical Doctor Association in
2011, 95 percent of physicians are dissatisfied with wages,
which are just 20 percent above the national average forall workers (Chinese Medical Doctor Association 2011).
Broadly, physicians are finding it challenging to develop
professional autonomy relative to hospitals that employ
them or a government that sets wages and other condi-
tions of employment.
Biopharmaceuticals, devices, and diagnostics
Spending on prescription drugs in China took off in the
mid-1990s, expanding since at an average annual rate of
20 percent (World Bank 2010). Total pharmaceutical
sales were 432 billion RMB ($69 billion) in 2011 and
are projected to grow to 521 billion RMB ($83 billion) in
2012 and 625 billion RMB ($100 billion) in 2013 (Business
Monitor International 2012). Alongside tremendous sales
growth, the market shifted to imported and joint-venture
branded drugs, with TCM and generics in relative decline.
Domestic products thus slid to 60 percent of drug sales in
2010 (World Bank 2010).
The potential size of China’s healthcare market has
contributed to multinational firms making significant
long-term investments in the country. Projects that tap
into China’s world-leading graduation of Ph.D. chemists
and biomedical scientists are multiplying; according to a
McKinsey Consulting report, “13 of the top 20 pharmacos
[sic] have established R&D centers in China, and several
have announced major manufacturing investments”
(Le Deu et al. 2012). Venture capital also has flowed
into China, with 70 VC-backed biotechnology com-
panies present in 2012, more than double that of any
other emerging market (Chakma et al. 2013). Drug mar-
keting, a hallmark of private-sector healthcare, has grown
exponentially. The total number of pharmaceutical sales
representatives in China outnumbered those in the United
States in 2012 (Le Deu et al. 2012).
Physicians and public health scholars have criticized
incentives for hospitals in China to push high-technology
services and expensive imported drugs to underwrite
profit margins (Blumenthal and Hsiao 2005). However,
world-class diagnostics and branded prescription drugs
also enjoy market pull in China from a growing middle
class and wealthy urban populations. An initiative in
the early 2000s that sought to reduce drug prices in
China through direct government controls produced
unintended consequences of drug shortages; patients
then were then switched to other costly drugs or less
effective alternatives (Meng et al. 2005; Chen and
Schweitzer 2008). The government subsequently sup-
ported free pricing of drugs even though H&FPC has
the mandate to develop an essential drugs list as part
of a plan to ensure the availability of low-cost treat-
ment choices nationwide.
Medical device firms also are enjoying growth from
market dynamics that encourage hospitals to acquire
new technologies and use them extensively. The device
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2012 (Business Monitor International 2012). In some
notable cases, early entrants have developed new im-
aging devices and diagnostic tests in China for Chinese
patients (Johnson & Johnson 2011). Yet foreign firms
often find it challenging to understand the hospital pro-
curement system for devices and diagnostics. Conse-
quently, some firms are switching from a strategy of
globally branded product development to partnerships
with local Chinese companies.
China’s domestic biopharmaceutical, device, and TCM
firms also are experiencing rapid growth. Historically,
provincial governments promoted local firms, leading
to a patchwork of over 5,000 small-scale generics pro-
ducers. Industry concentration is low, with the top
100 firms only accounting for one-third of national
drug sales (Sun et al. 2008). While some consolidation
has taken place in the past five years, new research-
oriented companies also are being founded at a rapid
rate, often with scientific collaborations and board
members from the United States and European countries.
Domestic firms thus occupy a complicated position,
serving local public interests of providing employ-
ment and supplying low-cost therapies even as
policymakers ask them to generate profits like other
private firms.
Overall, China’s prescription drug policies are at an in-
flection point. The country is home to 20 percent of the
world’s population, but consumed only seven percent of
total global drug expenditures and was a host to only
five percent of multi-sited clinical trials underway in
2012.d If firms invest in research and development on
par with the country’s rising international economic role,
medical industries will experience a major global shift.
However, unrestrained drug pricing by private firms is
subject to criticism for the opportunity costs imposed
on other parts of the healthcare system. With tighter
price regulation, China could broaden access. However,
price controls or prescription drug lists restricted to do-
mestic generics would undermine incentives for the
pharmaceutical industry to grow through research in-
vestments and new product development.
Demographics and disease
The healthcare system drew international scrutiny in
2003 when an outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome (SARS) in southern China spread to infect indi-
viduals in 37 countries. SARS eventually infected only
8,500 people worldwide with just 916 recorded fatalities
(Kleinman and Watson 2006). To senior Chinese health
officials, however, delays in identifying SARS and taking
action were an embarrassment. Significant investment in
public health and disease monitoring followed. The
disease continues to be invoked regularly by officialsadvocating for a greater role for public health in
China’s healthcare system (Chan et al. 2010).
Changes in lifestyle, diet, and the environment that are
accompanying China’s fast industrialization and eco-
nomic growth also are producing a national epidemio-
logical transition. Chronic diseases have become a
significant burden across the country, even as infectious
diseases including tuberculosis and viral hepatitis are
still prevalent (Yang et al. 2008). A 2010 study found
that nearly 10 percent of the population has type-2 dia-
betes while another 15 percent exhibit pre-diabetic
blood sugar levels (Yang et al. 2010). Other ailments as-
sociated with wealthier Western nations, including lung
and breast cancer, obesity, hypertension, and cardiovas-
cular disease are rising in incidence (Normile 2010).
According to a 2005 World Health Organization study,
China’s economy is projected to lose $560 billion by
2015 due to premature deaths from chronic diseases
(World Health Organization 2005).
China’s epidemiological transition also poses a chal-
lenge to physicians with little experience treating dis-
eases long prevalent in the West. In the case of cancer,
for example, Chinese physicians often continue to pre-
scribe aggressive drug treatments and initiate painful
surgical procedures after evidence suggests a shift to
palliative care would be preferable (Want et al. 2004).
Understanding of co-morbidities such as depression is
low among doctors treating cancer and other life-
threatening illnesses. In addition to parents overfeed-
ing children, a behavior ingrained from periods of ex-
treme scarcity, there is some evidence that elderly
Chinese who lived through famines in the late 1950s
and early 1960s are at an increased risk of developing
hyperglycemia and type-2 diabetes (Li et al. 2010).
But physicians find it uncomfortable to recommend
that parents feed their children less or that adults re-
duce their caloric intake.
Demographic factors also will raise considerable
challenges for China’s healthcare system in the future.
The population aged sixty and older is projected to
increase from 13 percent in 2012 to 34 percent in
2050. Overall, thanks to increasing life expectancies
and the one-child rule, China is likely to age more
rapidly than any country in history (United Nations
2011). Sustainable plans for public health spending
will have to account for a smaller future working
population.
Identity and goals
Reporting on its progress at the Eleventh National People’s
Congress in March 2011, the National Development and
Reform Commission described basic insurance coverage
of 1.3 billion residents and celebrated: “Smooth progress
was made in developing the medical and health service
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2011b). An ambitious plan is being followed:
By 2020, the basic health care system covering urban
and rural residents shall have been fundamentally
established. We shall have set up, across the country,
a fairly complete public health service system and
health care service system … a secured and relatively
well regulated pharmaceutical supply system,
a comparatively sound health care institution
management and operational system … the multi-
layer demands of the people for health care services
shall be met preliminarily, and the health level of the
people shall be further enhanced (National
Development and Reform Commission 2009).
The Chinese healthcare system at present is struggling
with an identity split. On the one hand, the system seeks
to deliver low-cost care to the world’s largest population
while also upgrading technologies, expertise, and the
quality of care through market incentives. On the other
hand, the system is seeking to maintain a balance
between central regulatory oversight and provincial
and local management of publicly owned and financed
care delivery.
With a high degree of out-of-pocket spending on pre-
scription drugs, but price controls on inpatient and out-
patient care, China’s distribution of spending is peculiar
in international comparison (see Table 2). Compared
with developed countries, total healthcare expenditures
per person in China are low, only four percent of those
in the United States and 10 percent of the OECD aver-
age. The structure of healthcare expenditure varies inter-
nationally, but China stands out for prescription drugs
taking up over 40 percent of all spending (compared to
approximately 12 percent in other countries), while
hospitalizations and outpatient care are far lower. As
overall health spending in China rises, the mix of
private spending on drugs and public spending on
hospitals will undergo a shift. Present negotiations
over public and private, and possible mixed-mandateTable 2 International healthcare expenditures (per capita, $U





United States 7,910 2,634
OECD Average 3,392 1,213
Data are from 2010, except Japan from 2009. Subcategories do not sum to total be
Sources: Adapted from P.R. China, Ministry of Health. 2012. Health Yearbook 2011. B
World Health Organization 2013. Global Health Observatory Data Repository, www.apublic-private corporations, will determine whether
the country aligns to other developed nations or pur-
sues a unique path.
Opportunities in public-private collaborations
In China’s 12th five year plan, approved in March 2011,
Communist Party leaders identified biomedicine as one
of seven sectors targeted for growth and grouped it with
energy and technology as Strategic Emerging Industries
(SEIs) (National Development and Reform Commission
2011a). Together, the SEIs are expected to contribute 15
percent of the country’s GDP by 2020. But growth in
healthcare sub-sectors, especially biopharmaceuticals,
medical devices, and diagnostics, could impose oppor-
tunity costs on other spending priorities.
Health systems around the world suffer from fragmen-
tation between components of care and locations for ac-
cess to care. Reform efforts that target greater system
integration commonly encounter a “trilemma” of diffi-
cult choices between access to health services, outcome
quality, and affordability (Bohmer 2009). China has a
unique opportunity to overcome this trilemma thanks to
its large population, two decades of sustained economic
expansion, and state capacity to undertake long-term
planning. In particular, current decisions to accelerate
spending on healthcare infrastructure and care come
at an opportune moment for the integration of infor-
mation technology, biomedical science, and medical
technologies.
Even as roles and boundaries of public and private are
determined for China’s healthcare system, opportunities
also are emerging for novel institutional forms. For
example, public-private partnerships (PPPs) involve a
negotiated division of resources, responsibilities, and
rewards between governments and private sector
firms (Nishtar 2004). In theory, PPPs can deliver pub-
lic goods more efficiently and at a lower cost than ei-
ther governments acting without profit incentives or
private firms operating without government-based au-
thority and legitimacy (Valente and Crane 2010). PPPs
have been criticized as giveaways to multinationalsS, PPP)







cause some services were excluded, such as long-term care and nursing.
eijing: MoH; OECD iLibrary. 2013. OECD Health Statistics, www.oecd-ilibrary.org;
pps.who.int/ghodata; accessed March 2013.
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1999). Nevertheless, they may offer China a route to
development of clinical trials and electronic medical
records that would benefit the country through better
patient care and outcomes as well as increased ex-
ports of high-value healthcare products and services.
Clinical trials in china
Analysts have warned in recent years that declining suc-
cess in pharmaceutical research and cost-cutting mea-
sures in developed countries are reducing incentives for
firms to invest in drug discovery (Pammolli et al. 2011).
At the same time, tremendous unmet medical needs are
present in aging populations. Countries worldwide are
struggling to treat rising numbers of patients with dia-
betes, rheumatoid arthritis, Parkinson’s, and Alzheimer’s
diseases. New treatments are likely to require health and
genetic data from large patient populations, in addition
to big clinical trials. Combining a growing scientific
workforce and a large patient population, China has the
potential to build domestic firms that develop and mar-
ket drugs globally and build clinical trials into a profi-
table international service business.
Drug development, including pre-clinical discovery,
the modification of compounds to make them safer and
more effective, and clinical testing all remain under-
developed in China. Seeking to overcome technical
barriers, government-sponsored projects are underway
to develop standards for pharmacokinetics, pharmaco-
dynamics, and other aspects of drug formulation. But po-
licy concerns about multinationals exploiting Chinese
patients have led to a process requiring 10 to 18 months
to authorize new trials. Likewise, accreditation of clinical
trial sites in China requires national and local government
reviews taking six months or more (Le Deu et al. 2012).
Rather than serve solely as an outsourcing location for
trials from the West, a domestic-oriented approach
would involve partnerships between biopharmaceutical
firms and consortia of urban hospitals working with
county and township health centers. By building a na-
tional clinical trial program, Chinese firms and Chinese
physicians would gain expertise in managing multi-sited
trials. The country’s potential to emerge as a global
leader for clinical trials was downplayed by analysts in
the mid-2000s, who instead expected India and Russia
to dominate (Bailey 2006). However, India has advanced
policies that strongly favor generic drug firms while tri-
als in Russia have proven difficult to manage. As a result,
the door is open for China to become a predictable and
secure site for large-scale clinical trials of new medi-
cines, devices, and surgical procedures. The key next
step involves expansion of pharmaceutical regulation to
ensure that human subjects are protected while physi-
cians and sponsor firms adhere to testing norms.Electronic medical records
Electronic medical records (EMRs), offer a second area
of biomedical knowledge development in which PPPs
can respond to domestic health needs and generate
international revenue. In late 2012, the Ministry of
Health began to solicit expert input on the basic struc-
ture of a system that will include: “summarized medical
records, outpatient services, hospitalizations, physical
check-ups, referrals, [and] medico-legal statements and
reports” (Interfax China 2009). Even as the government
develops standards for EMRs, it already has announced
a 3-stage plan for their adoption. Initially, hospitals are
to process financial, drug prescription, and other basic
data through computers. The second stage, termed “in-
formation system construction”, involves the storage and
management of full clinical information on every patient.
The third stage is targeted to information sharing across
municipalities and eventually, across the country (Xu
et al. 2011; Tu et al. 2012). As of late 2012, over one-
third of first and second-tier hospitals were using EMRs,
and 96 hospitals across the country were involved in a
pilot project to test more complete adoption of e-health
systems (Ministry of Health 2012b).
China is especially intriguing for the development of
EMRs because it has little legacy of paper patient re-
cords held in clinics or physicians’ offices. Instead, Chinese
citizens commonly have a small booklet containing
records from past doctor visits and hospitalizations. Pa-
tients’ ownership and management of their own health re-
cords in China fits uneasily with the more centralized
systems commonly associated with EMRs. Standards and
technologies necessary to EMR implementation are
owned and managed by hospitals and IT companies. At
present, health data are the property of the government. If
China creates an EMR system in the same way as in most
Western nations, patients will be shifted to a more passive
role relative to physicians and hospitals.
Alternatively, an EMR system that involves increasingly
tech-savvy Chinese in the management of their medical
data holds significant promise. Key features would need to
include access from mobile devices, two-way interactions
with medical authorities, and access to data for biomedical
researchers domestically and internationally via subscrip-
tion. In this way, patients could remain involved with their
own medical care even as the delivery of care improves
through better knowledge about health outcomes. At
present, EMRs are built through contracts between public
hospitals and private vendors; however, future PPPs between
healthcare IT firms and hospitals could foster the creation
of data that is also useful to biomedical researchers.
Conclusion
Whether the product of formal legislative design or a tacit
market-based outcome, health systems reflect underlying
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and private organizations. Healthcare reform processes
expose tensions that are not easily resolved, even with
additional spending. China’s healthcare system in the early
2010s faces contradictory mandates of providing baseline
coverage to a population of over 1.3 billion, improving the
quality of care, deepening the expertise of practitioners,
regulating the safety and quality of medicines, promoting
innovation of devices, drugs, and surgical techniques, and
fostering more systematic TCM approaches. Healthcare
also has become an integral part of the government’s plan
to achieve the status of a “moderately wealthy” country in
the near term. But the relative roles of public and private
are still being negotiated for insurance and care delivery,
in contrast to other countries where this boundary is more
firmly established.
In contemporary China, there is little private insurance
coverage and providers operate with low margins. The
system instead relies heavily on baseline insurance under
government programs and co-insurance by individuals
out of their savings. Health economists have suggested
that in an optimal co-insurance model, individuals are
covered for unexpected or financially catastrophic dis-
ease, but do not pressure physicians for excess treatment
since they must pay for it directly (Ma and McGuire
1997; Eggleston 2000). In China, however, out-of-pocket
spending is extremely high and contributes to a world-
leading savings rate. In effect, the Chinese are deferring
present consumption out of concern for future medical
bills. Proposals for new government-backed catastrophic
plans seek to create a broader redistribution system.
Under this scenario, China will have public insurance at
the top and bottom of the cost scale, and out-of-pocket
or private insurance for the middle. However, that deve-
lopment may severely constrain the development of pri-
vate insurance by making it too difficult for insurers to
create profitable patient pools. Catastrophic insurance
also may drive up costs as procedures price at or above
the coverage baseline.
Future growth of private insurance plans, specialty
clinics, and private hospitals in China hinges on the
resolution of a complex two-sided dilemma. For insurers
to expand and sell price-differentiated plans, clinics need
to offer high-quality services covered by the insurance.
Public hospitals, which bill patients at government-set
prices at the point of service are not equipped to handle
post-hoc private insurance reimbursement. But investors
need to be convinced of the viability of private insurance
plans in order to underwrite new private clinics. An in-
tegrated insurance and care delivery model could break
through this dilemma only if it simultaneously recruits
respected physicians and a broad enough pool of cus-
tomers that pay annual insurance premiums. If private
insurance develops in this manner, it will reduce someof the pressure on the public system but raise tensions
concerning inequality of access to top care facilities and
providers.
Healthcare systems are organized through core societal
compromises about the role of the state and private en-
terprise. In turn, choices made about the boundary of
public and private are revealing of national development
goals and strategies. As China plans further reforms,
policymakers are grappling with the dilemma that a fully
socialized system could deepen coverage, but at the ex-
pense of incentives for biomedical research investments.
Alternatively, a fully free-market system might better
reward physicians and promote innovation, but at the
expense of universal insurance and access. Central plan-
ners hold a vision of state-run institutions at the center,
for-profit firms in supplementary roles, and other non-
profit health entities making contributions through nurs-
ing homes and end-of-life care (National Development
and Reform Commission 2009). The development of
more broadly accessible health insurance is a vital next
step in China’s transition from a savings and investment
economic development model to consumption driven
growth.
Endnotes
aContextual translation of press conference videos
posted at: China.com (2012) Press conference of medical
and health system leadership team. http://www.china.
com.cn/zhibo/zhuanti/2013lianghui/content_28211342.
htm. Accessed 29 March 2013.
bAn exchange rate of 6.25 RMB per 1 USD is used
throughout the article, based on the average for calendar
year 2012.
cThis estimate is based on cases compiled at: China
Daily Forum (2012).
dAuthor’s analysis of data from P.R. China, Statistical
Yearbook; OECD iLibrary; ClinicalTrials.gov; and IMS
health.
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